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Credit derivative instruments allow default risk to be segregated from debt of all kinds. They have granted investors the 
ability to hedge their portfolios and provided numerous institutions with a new source of income. However, the market 
for credit default swaps is neither transparent nor regulated, perhaps undermining the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system it 
has helped innovate. 
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In the context of the current recession and the accompany-
ing ﬁ  nancial crisis, one hears of a vast number of innova-
tions in the products that investors and banks can use for 
handling various risks. Since the 1997 invention of the 
credit default swap (CDS), assuming and removing credit 
(or default) risk from a portfolio of assets has become a 
major risk management tool of the world’s largest and most 
dominant institutions, both ﬁ  nancial and nonﬁ  nancial.
The broad use of credit default swaps by market partici-
pants has been an important development, and their wide-
spread adoption and integration into ﬁ  nancial markets has 
fundamentally reshaped the risk management landscape of 
domestic and international ﬁ  nance. Yet the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers in 2008 and the government bailout of the 
insurer American International Group (AIG) revealed the 
systemic risks that CDSs can pose in their current form. 
In the case of AIG, the company’s aggregate exposure to 
credit derivatives was not revealed to the market and regu-
lators until it was already on the verge of a CDS-induced 
bankruptcy. The lack of sufﬁ  cient transparency in the 
derivatives market and regulation prevented these warning 
signs from being conveyed appropriately prior to near-
catastrophe. 
Market opacity played a role in the settlement of Lehman 
Brothers CDSs as well. The investment bank’s bankruptcy 
meant that CDS sellers would be forced to pay out tens of 
billions of dollars, but it was unclear which sellers ulti-
mately held the exposure, and whether they would be able 
to pay given the stressed ﬁ  nancial environment. Fortunately, 
the settlement did not breed further turmoil, but the episode 
highlighted the danger of an opaque, unregulated market 
failing to operate under—and even contributing to—condi-
tions of extreme systemic distress.
By enabling investors to subtract or accumulate credit expo-
sure in their portfolios, credit default swaps have provided a 
valuable function in markets and will likely continue to do 
so, albeit within a new regulatory structure. This Commentary 
explains how CDSs work, why they are useful for shedding 
risk or speculating on market conditions, and why CDS 
markets might need to be reformed. 
Deﬁ  ning a Credit Default Swap
At its most fundamental level, the CDS is analogous to 
an insurance contract, though it differs in ways that are 
important in understanding how they are used. An insur-
ance contract might insure a homeowner by providing a 
payment in the event of a house ﬁ  re. The homeowner pays 
premiums at set dates, and if a ﬁ  re occurs, the premiums 
stop and the insurance company pays the homeowner the 
claim, which depends on the amount of damage done to the 
house. In the same way, a CDS “insures” the holder of the 
contract against a corporate default. In exchange, the writer 
of the CDS contract receives “premium” payments. How-
ever, the analogy with insurance extends only so far. One 
major difference between the two contracts is that the CDS 
can be bought by a person who does not actually hold the 
underlying asset (a bond). (Imagine trying to buy insurance 
for a house that one does not own!) Consequently, the total 
value of CDS contracts can (and frequently does) exceed the 
amount of outstanding debt being insured.
Defaults of corporations—called reference entities with 
regard to the CDS instrument—are the most common events 
these contracts are written against, but protection can also 
be bought against the default on the debt of sovereign 
nations, including the United States. 
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too), the primary risk for the investor is that the company 
will go bankrupt and not repay the principal on the bonds. 
To insure against this possibility, the investor can buy a 
credit default swap on the underlying bonds. If the compa-
ny begins to show signs of ﬁ  nancial trouble before maturity, 
the value of its bonds will fall, but the value of the investor’s 
CDS contract will rise. The contract protects the investor 
from price movements in the bonds attributable to credit risk. 
In terms of an overall investment portfolio, CDSs prevent 
value ﬂ  uctuations that are due to changes in the credit qual-
ity of CDS-referenced investments. Portfolio managers can 
also hedge by buying real assets with default risk that is in-
versely correlated with the company’s, but this would likely 
entail assuming new risks at the same time and otherwise 
affecting the balance of the portfolio. Buying a credit default 
swap is much more efﬁ  cient since it eliminates the desired 
amount of credit risk speciﬁ  cally, without also creating new 
risks to hedge.
Because buying a CDS is a bet against the ﬁ  nancial pros-
pects of a corporation or sovereign, and selling a CDS is a 
bet for them, the contracts also provide speculators with a 
means of gaining exposure to (that is, placing bets for or 
against) these entities without purchasing the underlying 
assets. As CDS markets have developed, speculation in the 
markets has attracted negative attention, just as it did in the 
early days of the futures exchanges. But one must be cau-
tious about assuming that speculation is necessarily a bad 
thing. Market making—trading with both buyers and sellers 
to maintain orderly transactions—is an essential property of 
a liquid market, and speculators deepen the CDS market 
and allow investors to more easily hedge credit risk with 
speciﬁ  c contracts. 
In exchange, credit default swaps can be a source of income 
for those speculative institutions willing to bear their risk. 
The breadth of CDS sellers ranges from hedge funds to 
major ﬁ  nancial institutions. The large insurer AIG and a 
number of smaller bond insurers have written billions of 
dollars’ worth of CDSs on companies and mortgage securi-
ties since the introduction of credit derivatives. Commercial 
banks and investment banks also became heavily involved 
in the credit derivatives market amid the competitive (and 
often highly lucrative) environment of the banking industry 
in recent years.
An Over-the-Counter Market
Credit default swaps are currently traded in the over-the-
counter (OTC) market. A potential buyer contacts a seller 
directly and arranges a contract, including negotiation of 
the spread. OTC sales are thus bilateral arrangements 
between the buyer of the CDS and the seller. OTC con-
tracts are advantageous to buyers because contracts can be 
specially tailored to handle the particular amount of credit 
risk that a buyer would like to hedge against for a particular 
amount of time. 
In a typical transaction, the seller of the protection takes on 
the credit risk associated with a reference entity in return 
for a quarterly premium paid by the buyer. The premium, 
or spread, is quoted as the total annual payment divided by 
the face amount of the reference entity’s debt that is being 
protected. CDS premiums are quoted in basis points per 
year (where one basis point equals 0.01 percent), usually 
for a standardized contract protecting $10 million, with a 
contract life of ﬁ  ve years. So, if a bank holds $20 million of 
a company’s bonds and a CDS for that company is sell-
ing for 100 basis points (1 percent), it would cost the bank 
$200,000 a year to protect itself against default on the bonds 
for ﬁ  ve years. 
As in a house ﬁ  re, where the insurance covers only the dam-
age on the house, a credit default swap covers the “damage” 
caused by the default. Thus, if a bond is worth only 60 
cents on the dollar in the event of a default, the seller of the 
CDS will pay the remaining 40 cents.
The amount paid can be determined in one of two ways. 
One is that the holder of the CDS contract can present the 
seller with the defaulted bond, which is then exchanged in 
a physical settlement for its face value. A second method of 
settling is for the difference between the face value and the 
market value of the referenced corporation’s debt to be paid 
to the holder of the contract in a cash settlement. 
The fundamental difference between the methods is that 
one (physical settlement) requires that the underlying asset 
be presented to receive reimbursement. At times, the market 
value of the debt after a default can be difﬁ  cult to deter-
mine because the underlying bonds are no longer traded, 
and in such cases, the large sellers of the contracts hold an 
auction. Buyers and sellers of the underlying bonds submit 
bid and offer prices to the auctioneer, who then determines 
a settlement price—or recovery value—for the securities. 
For instance, if the auction settles on a recovery value of 
20 cents on the dollar for the bonds, a CDS seller would 
be obligated to make bondholders whole by paying out the 
other 80 cents.
Improved Hedging through Credit Default Swaps
CDSs are derivative instruments because their ﬁ  nancial 
value is derived from the value of an underlying ﬁ  nancial 
asset, usually a bond. The ability to trade derivatives allows 
the various risks of an asset to be transferred to counter-
parties willing to bear them without the underlying asset 
being involved in the trade—or even being held by either the 
buyer or the seller. CDS contracts represent the exchange of 
a speciﬁ  c risk—corporate or sovereign default—between two 
investors making opposite bets, the CDS seller who bets the 
borrower will not default, and the CDS buyer who bets it 
will. This exchange of risk leads, naturally, to investment 
hedging, an important use of CDSs. 
Suppose a long-term investor owns a sizable dollar amount 
of bonds of a company. Leaving aside the risk that interest 
rates might vary substantially during the life of the bonds 
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some limited arrangements that reduce counterparty risk—
that is, the risk that one or the other of the parties to the 
CDS agreement will default on the agreement. A coun-
terparty default would occur if a buyer is unable to make 
contractual premium payments or if the seller is unable to 
pay out the notional value of the CDS in the event of a ref-
erence entity default. Many contracts contain provisions for 
collateral posting as CDS prices ﬂ  uctuate, in order to offset 
the counterparty risk that increases along with the probabil-
ity of default for the underlying bonds. That is, when the 
chance of paying out increases because the underlying bond 
is performing poorly, the CDS seller “puts money down” to 
offset the risk it will not fulﬁ  ll its obligation. 
However, the relative security gained from collateral posting 
is contingent upon the transparency of CDS pricing and the 
framework for enforcing these provisions. Generally, the 
CDS market lacks the strong transparency and enforcement 
mechanisms characteristic of futures clearinghouses and 
exchange-traded securities markets. Pricing is not transpar-
ent for contracts that trade infrequently because the OTC 
derivatives market lacks a centralized trading location that 
can quote an all-inclusive market price, as exchanges do. 
Instead, a quote must be constructed by surveying vari-
ous dealers of the CDS contract of interest. Without clear 
pricing, the market value (and thus the necessary collateral 
requirements) of a given CDS contract is more difﬁ  cult and 
time-expensive to determine than if the consensus price of 
the market was quoted by a centralized entity.
Perhaps more importantly, the OTC market’s lack of a cen-
tralized clearing system hampers any attempt to determine 
the size and location of credit risk exposure to a particular 
reference entity. Exiting or “unwinding” a contract is not 
a simple matter of trading the swap to a new counterparty 
as a unit, as one can a share of stock. The holder of a 
CDS looking to ofﬂ  oad credit protection must write a new 
contract protecting a new counterparty, which on a net basis 
removes the exposure. That is, the original CDS buyer must 
hold two contracts that cancel each other out. Consequently, 
some portion of the enormous $50 trillion number often 
associated with the size of the CDS market is redundant. It 
counts all contracts and does not account for the contracts 
that have been effectively canceled out by offsetting contracts. 
Indeed, the double counting goes much further. Suppose 
an investor owns $100 million of a corporation’s debt and 
decides to hedge it with a CDS bought from a broker. Since 
both buyer and seller are surveyed when assessing the size 
of the market, the outstanding CDS is counted as $200 
million. The broker then hedges her exposure by buying 
a CDS from a bank, which buys from a hedge fund that is 
willing to bear the default risk on the original corporation. 
So what should normally be thought of as $100 million of 
exposure in the CDS market is listed as $600 million in 
outstanding CDSs (three interconnected bilateral contracts, 
each double-counted). 
1. Commercial Bank Derivatives
Source: Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.
Such chains of hedging are common, and more complex chains 
are not uncommon, complicating efforts to pin down the actual 
magnitude and “location” (those holders with a positive net 
buyer or seller position) of credit exposure. Figure 1 shows that 
the total notional amount of CDS exposure held by commercial 
banks in the United States is $14.6 trillion, according to the Of-
ﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency. This number is subject 
to the double-counting problem. 
Recent events show that the location, or distribution, of CDS 
exposure is of great concern. The near-meltdown of the ﬁ  nancial 
system in September 2008 occurred largely because of AIG’s 
extensive CDS exposure. AIG had sold CDS contracts, referenc-
ing a large number of corporate entities and complex mortgage 
securities, to major commercial and investment banks around 
the globe. The insurer faced the aforementioned collateral 
requirements last September as the credit quality and liquidity 
of these securities became more suspect, and because the ﬁ  rm 
lost its triple-A credit rating. But without a substantial loan from 
the Federal Reserve, AIG would have been unable to meet the 
collateral calls and thus would have precipitated a massive coun-
terparty default. This in turn would have hit dozens of large 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and dangerously decapitalized them. 
The key point is that the market’s opacity prevented market 
participants from knowing where an AIG counterparty default 
would fall, and to what extent. Such uncertainty contributed 
to the massive “run” on the entire ﬁ  nancial system. The CDS 
market did not—and still does not—provide a clear picture of 
counterparty exposures throughout the ﬁ  nancial system upon 
which investors and regulators can act.
Systemic Consequences of CDSs
While CDS transactions allow the broad investor community 
(including banks) to add or subtract pockets of credit exposure 
from their portfolios, the realities of the current over-the-counter 
market for CDSs—with its minimal disclosure and acute vulner-
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of a highly interconnected ﬁ  nancial system. What’s more, 
some have noted that the very existence of credit default 
swaps leads to skewed incentives for CDS-protected bond-
holders, who may be less inclined to monitor a borrower 
or participate in an out-of-bankruptcy restructuring if they 
know that they will be fully reimbursed in the event of 
default. 
In spite of these systemic and market incentive issues, credit 
default swaps are unlikely to disappear from the ﬁ  nancial 
scene any time soon. They have proved to be both useful 
and lucrative. Because a great deal of the danger they pose 
has recently been borne by taxpayers, the CDS market is 
likely to see substantial reform. Reforms are likely to main-
tain most of the derivatives’ functions while reducing their 
potential impact on ﬁ  nancial stability and market competi-
tiveness. Current proposals call for the creation of centralized 
clearinghouses or exchanges, which would go a long way 
toward extending transparency and standardization to the 
CDS and other derivatives markets.
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